

QUESTION VIII

THOSE THINGS THAT ARE PREDICATED OF GOD RELATIVELY FROM ETERNITY

THERE are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether relations predicated of God from eternity and signified by the names Father and Son are real or logical relations. (2) In God is relation his substance? (3) Do the relations constitute and distinguish the persons and hypostases? (4) If the relations be mentally abstracted do the hypostases remain in God?

Q. VIII: ARTICLE I

Are the Relations Predicated of God From Eternity Real Or Only Logical Relations?

[C.G. IV, xiv: Sum. Th. I, Q. xxviii, A. x]

WE have now to inquire into the relations attributed to God from eternity: and the first point of inquiry is whether the relations attributed to God from eternity and signified by the names Father and Son be real or only logical relations. It would seem that they are not real.

1. According to Damascene (De Fid. Orth. i, ii) in the subsistent Trinity there is something common and identical, and if there be any distinction or diversity this is in our knowledge and understanding. Now the Persons are distinct by their relations. Therefore in God the relations are merely logical.

2. Boethius says (De Trin. iv): Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Spirit is like the relation of the same to the same. Now the relation of identity is purely logical. Therefore such are the relations of paternity and filiation.

3. In God there is no, real relation to the creature, because he produced creatures without any change in himself, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16). Now much more true is it that the Father produced the Son, and the Son proceeded from the Father without any change taking place. Therefore in God there is no real relation in the Father to the Son or vice versa.

4. Things that are not perfect, such as privation, matter and movement, are not attributed to God. Now of all things relation has the most unstable being, so much

so that some have reckoned it among the predicables; according to the Commentator (Metaph. xi). Therefore there can be no relation in God.

5. In creatures there is always composition of the relation and its subject: for one thing cannot inhere to another without composition., Now there can be no composition in God. Therefore there cannot be real relation in him.

6. Things that are absolutely simple differ from one another by themselves. Now the divine Persons are absolutely simple. Therefore they differ by themselves and by any relations: and consequently there is no need of putting relations in God, since the only reason for doing so is to distinguish the Persons.

7. just as the relations are properties of the divine Persons so are the absolute attributes properties of the essence. Now the absolute attributes have only a logical being in God. Therefore the relations in God are merely logical.

8. A perfect thing lacks nothing (Phys. iii). Now the divine substance is most perfect, and consequently lacks nothing that pertains to its perfection. Therefore there is no need to place relations in God.

9. Seeing that God is the first beginning and last end of things, anything that is reducible to something previous cannot be in God, but only those things to which others are reduced: thus the movable is reducible to the immovable, and the accidental to the essential; wherefore God is not moved, and nothing in him is accidental. Now everything that denotes 'to-another' being is reducible to absolute or 'to-itself' being. Therefore in God nothing is relative to another but all is absolute.

10. By his very nature God exists of necessity. Now everything that by its very nature exists of necessity is absolute: for the relative cannot exist without its

correlative. But that which by its very nature exists of necessity, does not cease to exist when something else is removed. Therefore no real relations are in God.

11. As stated in the preceding question (A. 9) every real relation arises from some kind of quantity or from action or passion. But there is no quantity in God: for in the words of Augustine (De Trin. v, i) "God is great without quantity." Nor is there number in him, as Boethius says (De Trin.), whence relations could arise, although there is number resulting from relations. Hence if there be real relations in God they must be attributed to him in respect of some action of his. Not, however, in respect of the action whereby he brings creatures into being, since in the preceding question (A. 10) it was proved that there is no real relation in God to creatures. Nor again in respect of the personal action ascribed to God, such as generation: for seeing that in God to beget belongs to a distinct hypostasis, and distinction arises only from relation, it will be necessary for the relation to precede such an action, so that it cannot result from it. Accordingly we must conclude that, if any real relation in God arises from his action, it must be consequent upon his eternal or essential action of intelligence or volition. But even this is impossible, since such an action results in the relation between the one who understands and the thing understood, and such a relation in God cannot be real: else in God be who understands and that which he understands would be really distinct, which is clearly false, since each is predicated of each Person: for not only does the Father understand, but also the Son and the Holy Spirit: and likewise each of them is understood. Wherefore seemingly no real relation is in God.

12. Man's natural reason can attain to the knowledge of the divine mind: for it has been demonstrated by philosophers that God is intelligence. If then real relations which in God are said to distinguish the Persons arise from the action of the intellect, it would seem possible for human reason to discover the Trinity of Persons, and this would no longer be an article of faith. For faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not (Heb. xi, i).

13. Relative opposition is divided against other kinds of opposition: and the latter cannot be ascribed to God. Neither therefore can relative opposition.

On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that "relation alone multiplies the Trinity." Now this multiplication is not merely logical but is real, for as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three things. Therefore the relations in God are not merely logical but real.

Again, that which is real is constituted by something real. Now the relations in God are properties which constitute the Persons; and person signifies something real. Therefore the divine relations also must be real.

Again, generation is more perfect in God than in creatures. Now in creatures generation produces a real relationship, namely that of father and son. Therefore a fortiori relations in God are real.

I answer that those who follow the teaching of the catholic faith must hold that the relations in God are real. The catholic faith teaches that there are in God three Persons of one Essence. Now number results from some kind of distinction — wherefore in God there must be some distinction not only in respect of creatures who differ from him in nature, but also in respect of someone subsisting in the divine nature. But this distinction cannot regard anything absolute, since whatsoever is predicated of God absolutely denotes the divine essence, so that it would follow that the divine Persons differ essentially, which is the heresy of Arius. It follows then that the divine Persons are distinct only by their relations. Now this distinction cannot be merely logical, because things that are only logically distinct can be predicated of one another: thus we say that the beginning is the end, because one point in reality is both beginning and end (of a line) although there is a logical distinction. Hence it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father: because seeing that names are given in order to distinguish things, it would follow that the divine Persons differ only in name, which is the heresy of Sabellius. It remains thus to be said that the relations in God are something real: how this may be we must endeavour to discover by following the statements of holy men, although reason is unable to do so fully.

We must observe then that since a real relation cannot be conceived unless it arise from quantity or from action or passion, it follows that we must posit relation in God according to one of these modes. Now in God there cannot be quantity either continuous or discrete, nor anything bearing a likeness to quantity, except number arising from and presupposing relation; and unity, which regards the essence, the consequent relation of which is not real but merely logical, as, for instance, the relation implied in the word same, as we have stated in the preceding question (A. ii). It follows then that we ascribe to God the relation that arises from action: not indeed the action that passes into something passive, since nothing is passive in God in whom there is no matter, and there is no relation in God to what is outside him, as we have proved (Q. vii, A. 10). Consequently real relation in God must follow the action that remains in the agent, and in God these are intelligence and volition, since sensation through being effected by means of a corporeal organ cannot be attributed to God who is wholly incorporeal. For this reason Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi) says that in God Fatherhood is perfect, i.e. not corporeally or materially but intelligibly. Now the one who understands may have a relation to four things in understanding: namely to the thing understood, to the intelligible species whereby his intelligence is made actual, to his act of understanding, and to his intellectual concept. This concept differs from the three others.

It differs from the thing understood, for the latter is sometimes outside the intellect, whereas the intellectual concept is only in the intellect. Moreover the intellectual concept is ordered to the thing understood as its end, inasmuch as the intellect forms its concept thereof that it may know the thing understood.

It differs from the intelligible species, because the latter which makes the intellect actual is considered as the principle of the intellect's act, since every agent acts forasmuch as it is actual: and it is made actual by a form, which is necessary as a principle of action.

And it differs from the act of the intellect, because it is considered as the term of the action, and as something effected thereby. For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the thing, or even an affirmative or negative proposition.

This intellectual concept in us is called properly a word, because it is this that is signified by the word of mouth. For the external utterance does not signify the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the concept of the intellect by means of which it relates to the thing. Accordingly this concept or word by which our intellect understands a thing distinct from itself originates from another and represents another. It originates from the intellect through an act of the intellect: and it is the likeness of the thing understood. Now when the intellect understands itself this same word or concept is its progeny and likeness, that is of the intellect understanding itself. And this happens because the effect is like its cause in respect of its form, and the form of the intellect is the thing understood. Wherefore the word that originates from the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood, whether this be the intellect itself or something else. And this word of our intellect is extrinsic to the essence of the intellect (for it is not the essence but a kind of passion thereof), yet it is not extrinsic to the intellect's act of intelligence, since this act cannot be complete without it. If then there be an intellect whose act of intelligence is its very essence, it follows that this word is not extrinsic to the essence of that intellect even as it is not extrinsic to its act of intelligence. Such is the divine intellect: since in God to be and to understand are the same. Wherefore his word is not outside his essence, but co-essential with it. Accordingly in God we find the origin of one from another, namely a word proceeding, and one from whom the word proceeds without prejudice to the unity of the essence. For whenever one thing originates from another there must be a real relation—either only on the part of that which originates, when it receives not the same nature as its principle, as in the creature's origination from God—or on the part of both, when to wit that which originates attains to the nature of its principle, as when a man is begotten, and a real relation results between father and son. Now in God the Word is co-essential with its principle, as we have proved. It follows then that in God there is a real relation both on the part of the Word and on the part of the Speaker.

Reply to the First Objection. In the divine Persons there is essential unity, but there is a logical distinction by reason of the relation which does not differ from the Essence really but only logically, as we shall state further on.

Reply to the Second Objection. Relation in the divine Persons bears a certain likeness to the relation of identity if we consider the unity of Essence: whereas if we consider the origin of one (Person) from another in the same nature we must conclude that these relations are real.

Reply to the Third Objection. just as God undergoes no change in producing his creature, so is he not changed in the production of his Word. Yet the creature does not attain to the divine essence and nature, wherefore the divine essence is not communicated to the creature. For this reason the relation of God to the creature does not result from anything in God but only with respect to something done on the part of the creature. On the other hand the Word is produced as co-essential with God himself; wherefore God is related to his Word in respect of something in God and not only with respect to something on the part of the Word. For then is there a real relation on one side and not on the other, when the cause of the relation is on one side and not on the other: for instance, the relation between the knowable object and knowledge results from the act of the knower and not from anything that he may know.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Relation has a most unstable existence, if this belongs to it alone: but it is not so in God, for in him relation has no other existence than that of the substance, as we shall show further on in the next Article. Hence the argument fails.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. This argument considers the real relation whose being is distinct from the substance in which it is. But this is not so in the case in point, as we shall show further on.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Since the divine Persons differ by their relations only, they do not differ otherwise than by themselves, for the relations are the very Persons who subsist, as we shall prove (A. 4).

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The essential attributes which are properties of the essence are in God really and not logically. For God's goodness is something. real, and so is his wisdom and so forth, although they are not distinct from his essence otherwise than logically: and the same applies to the relations, as we shall prove further on.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. God's substance would be imperfect were there anything in it distinct therefrom. But in God relation is his substance, as we shall prove further on: wherefore the objection fails.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The movable and the accidental are reducible to something previous as the imperfect to the perfect. For an accident is imperfect: and movement is the act of what is imperfect. But relation sometimes follows from the perfection of a thing, as in the case of the intellect, since it follows the operation which is its perfection. Hence the divine perfection does not hinder us from ascribing relations to God, as it forbids us to ascribe movement and accident to him.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. That which necessarily exists of itself is not related to anything extraneous, but nothing prevents it from being related to something within it. Wherefore as it is not said to be necessary through another, it is said to be necessary of itself.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Real relation in God follows the action of his intellect, not as though this real relation were that of the one who understands to what he understands, but to his word: for the word and not the thing understood proceeds from him who understands.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although natural reason is able to succeed in proving that God is intelligence, it is not able to discover adequately his mode of understanding. just as we are able to know that God. is but not what he is: even so we are able to know that God understands, but not how he understands. Now to

understand by conceiving a word belongs to the mode of understanding: wherefore reason cannot prove this adequately, but it can form a kind of conjecture by comparison with what takes place in us.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. In other kinds of opposition one of the extremes is always by way of being imperfect or non-existent, or with an admixture of non-entity: since negation excludes being and privation is a negation, and of two contraries one always includes a privation. Hence other kinds of opposition cannot be in God, whereas relative opposition can because on neither side does it imply imperfection.

Q. VIII: ARTICLE II

Is Relation in God the Same As His Substance?

[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxviii, A. 2: C.G. IV, xiv]

THE second point of inquiry is whether in God relation is his substance: and seemingly it is not.

1. That no substance is a relation is a self-evident proposition like no substance is a quantity. Neither then is God's substance a relation.

2. It will be replied that God's substance is a real and not merely a logical relation.

On the contrary an idea to which nothing real corresponds is idle and vain. But nothing is vain in God. Therefore it is not possible that relation in God differ logically from his substance.

3. The divine Persons are distinct by their relations: for "relation alone multiplies the Trinity," according to Boethius (*De Trin.*). If then the divine Persons are not distinct in substance, seeing that the relations add nothing real to the substance but only a logical consideration, it will follow that the distinction between the divine Persons is only logical; which is the heresy of Sabellius.

4. The divine Persons are not distinct by anything absolute. because it would follow that they are distinct in essence, since what is said of God absolutely signifies his essence; for instance, goodness, wisdom and so forth. If then the relations are the same thing as the divine essence it will follow either that the divine Persons are not distinct by the relations, or that they are distinct in essence.

5. If relation is the same thing as God's very substance, it will follow that just as God and his greatness belong to the predicament of substance, since God is his own greatness, so likewise Paternity will belong to the predicament of substance: so that whatsoever is said of God will be said in reference to his substance, which is contrary to the statement of Augustine (*De Trin.* v, 4, 5) that not all the things said of God refer to his substance: for relations are ascribed to God such as that of Father and Son.

6. Whatsoever is said of the predicate may be said of the subject. But if relation is God's very essence, it will be true to say: The divine essence is Paternity, and with equal reason: Filiation is the divine essence: and thus it would follow that Filiation is Paternity.

7. Things that are the same admit of the same predicates thus the Philosopher says (*Top.* i): "The slightest difference that we may assign will show that the things are not the same." Now we predicate of the divine essence that it is wise, that it created the world and so on: while such things, apparently, are not predicated of Paternity and Filiation. Therefore in God relation is not the divine essence.

8. That which distinguishes the divine Persons is not the same thing as that which neither distinguishes them nor is itself distinguished. Now in God relation distinguishes while essence neither distinguishes nor is distinguished. Therefore they are not the same thing.

9. One and the same thing cannot by its essence be the cause of contraries except accidentally. Now distinction which in God results from relation is contrary to unity, the principle of which is the essence. Therefore relation and essence are not the same thing.

10. If two things are the same with each other, where one is there is the other. If then the divine essence is the same thing with Paternity, wheresoever is the divine essence there will be Paternity. But it is in the Son. Therefore Paternity is also: which is clearly false.

11. In God relation and essence differ at least in our conception of them. Now where the concept or definition differs, there is a different being; since a definition states the quiddity of a thing's being. Hence in God the being of the relation will differ from the being of the substance. Consequently relation and substance differ in being, and therefore really.

12. According to the Philosopher (Praedic.) the being of relation is to be 'to-another.' Therefore the being of relation and not the being of substance consists in respect to another. Therefore relation and substance are not the same in being; and we come to the same conclusion as before.

13. Augustine says (De Trin. V, 4, 5) that something is said of God not substantively but relatively. Now that which signifies the divine substance is predicated substantively. Therefore in God relation does not signify the essence: and the same conclusion follows.

14. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that God is not God in the same way as he is Father. Now he is God by the divine essence, but Father by Paternity. Therefore the essence is not Paternity: wherefore in God the relations are not the divine substance.

On the contrary, whatsoever is in God is God, as Augustine says (De Trin. V, 5). Now relation is in God, as Paternity in the Father. Therefore relation is God himself and the divine substance.

Again every suppositum containing things that are different is composite. Now in the person of the Father there is Paternity and the essence: wherefore if Paternity and the divine essence are two things it will follow that the person of the Father is composite; and this is clearly false. It follows therefore that in God relation is the very substance.

I answer that given that there are relations in God we are bound to say that they are the divine essence: else we would have to say that there is composition in God and that the divine relations are accidents, since whatsoever adheres to a thing besides its substance is an accident. It would also follow that something that is not the divine substance is eternal; and all these things are heretical.

Accordingly to make the matter clear we must observe that some of the nine kinds of accident are defined with regard to the nature of an accident, for the nature of an accident is to inhere; wherefore I describe those as defined. with regard to the nature of an accident which are defined as inhering to a subject, such as quantity and quality. On the other hand relation is not defined with regard to its nature as an accident, for it is described not as being in a subject but as having a respect to something extraneous. For this reason the Philosopher (Metaph. v) says that knowledge as a relation is not in the knower but in the thing known. Hence through taking note of the manner of signification in relative terms some said that they are not adherents but as it were assistants to substance, because they denote a kind of medium between the related substance and that to which it is related. From this it was necessary to infer that in creatures relations are not accidents,

since the being of an accident is to be in (a subject). Hence certain theologians of the school of Gilbert de la Porrée extended this opinion to the divine relations, and contended that the relations are not in the divine Persons but are assistants to them as it were. And seeing that the divine essence is in the Persons it followed that the relations are not the divine essence: and since every accident adheres (to a subject) it followed that they are not accidents: and in this sense they took the saying of Augustine quoted above, namely that relations are not predicated of God either substantively or accidentally. But from this opinion it follows that relation is not an objective reality but only a subjective idea: since every real thing is either a substance or an accident. For this reason some of the ancient reckoned relation among the predicables, as the Commentator remarks (Metaph. xi, com. 19): wherefore the followers of de la Porrée are compelled to hold that the divine relations are merely logical. Thus it would follow that the distinction between the Persons is not real: which is heretical.

Accordingly we must reply that a thing may be adherent and yet not be defined as adherent: even as action is not defined as being in but from the agent, and yet it is clear that it is in the agent. In like manner although relation is not defined as adhering yet it needs must be adherent that is to say when it is a real relation, for if it be a logical relation it is not adherent. And just as in creatures it must be an accident, so in God it must be the substance, since whatsoever is in God is his substance. Therefore real relations, must be the divine substance, yet they have not the mode of substance, but receive another mode of predication differing from those things that are predicated of God substantively.

Reply to the First Objection. No substance that is in a genus can be a relation, because it is confined to one genus and is therefore excluded from another. The divine essence however! is not in the genus of substance, but is above every genus, and comprises the perfection of all genera Wherefore nothing prevents its including that which pertains to relation.

Reply to the Second Objection. Substance and relation differ logically and in that thing which is God something corresponds to both: yet not a different thing to each but one and the same. Moreover it is most appropriate that one thing should

correspond to two points of view, when its nature comprises that thing perfectly: and thus it is in the case in point.

Reply to the Third Objection. Although relation does not add a thing to the essence, but only a point of view, yet it is itself a thing, even as goodness is a thing in God, and yet it does not differ from the essence otherwise than logically; and the same applies to wisdom. Wherefore just as things which pertain to goodness or wisdom, such as intelligence and so on, are really in God, even so that which is proper to a real relation, namely opposition and distinction, is really in God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The essential attributes not only signify that which is the divine essence, but they also signify it in a certain way, since they signify something as existing in God: and for this reason a difference in respect of anything absolute would reflect on the divine essence. On the other hand the divine relations, though they signify that which is the divine essence, they do not signify it by way of essence, since they do not convey the idea of existence in something, but of reference towards something else. Hence the distinction arising from the divine relations does not point to a distinction in the essence but only to respect to another by way of origin, as explained above.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although the relation is the divine substance, it does not convey the idea of substance, as already explained: wherefore it is not predicated substantively, because to be predicated thus belongs to the mode of signification.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument applies to the per se predicables. Now a thing is predicated per se of something when the predication regards the proper nature of that thing; whereas if the predication arises not from the proper nature but from identity, it is not even per se predication. Hence when it is said, The divine essence is Paternity, Paternity is predicated of the divine essence on account not of a logical but of a real identity: and the same applies if essence be predicated of Paternity, as already stated; because essence and relation differ logically. Wherefore this argument falls into the fallacy of accident: because although there is no

accident in God, there is a certain likeness to an accident, inasmuch as things which are predicated of one another in respect of an accident while differing logically have but one subject.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3) it is not things which are in any way the same that receive the same predicates but only those that have the same definition. Now the divine essence and Paternity, although the same in reality, have not the same definition: wherefore it does not follow that whatsoever is predicated of the one is predicated of the other. It must be observed, however, that certain things follow the definitions of essence and relation: wherefore one of these removes the other; thus neither does essence distinguish nor is relation common. On the other hand certain things imply a certain difference from the definition of essence or relation, not in their principle signification but in their mode of signifying: and these are predicated of essence or relation, although not properly: such are adjectives and verbal substantives, e.g. good, wise, to understand, to will: because suchlike terms as to the thing signified, signify the essence, yet they signify it as though it were a supposite and not in the abstract. For this reason good, wise, creating and the like are most appropriately predicated of the Persons and of the concrete essential names such as God, Father; yet they may be predicated, albeit improperly, of the essence in the abstract and not taken as a supposite. Still less properly are they predicated of the relations: because they are applicable to the supposite in respect of the essence and not of the relation: thus God is good or creative through having his essence—not through having a relation.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. That which causes a distinction and that which neither distinguishes nor is distinguished can be the same in reality but not logically.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The unity of the essence is not opposed to the distinction of the relations: wherefore it does not follow that relation and essence are causes of contraries.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. If two things be the same both really and logically, wherever the one is there must the other be. But this does not necessarily apply when they are the same really but not logically: thus the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the past: yet not the beginning of the future but that which is the beginning of the future is said to be in the past. In like manner we do not say that Paternity is in the Son, but that which is Paternity, the essence.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there is no being save that of the essence, even as there is no (act of) understanding but the intellect—and therefore as in God there is but one act of understanding, so is there but one being Wherefore it can nowise be granted that in God the being of the. relations is distinct from the being of the essence. Now the definition of a thing does not signify its being but its being this or that, namely what that thing is. Wherefore two definitions of one thing do not prove that it has a twofold being, but that it can be said in two ways of that thing that it is: thus we may say of a point what it is as a beginning, and what it is as an end,. on account of the, different definitions of beginning and end.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Since in creatures relation is an accident its being is to be in something, and. not to have a respect to some other thing: but considered as a relation its being is to have respect to something else.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Relatives are said not to be predicated of God substantially, because they are not predicated as something existing in a substance, but as having a respect to something else, yet not as though that which they signify were not the substance.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. God is said not to be God in the same way as Father on account of the different ways of signifying godhead and paternity, as explained above.

Q. VIII: ARTICLE III

Do the Relations Constitute and Distinguish the Persons Or Hypostases?

[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxx, A. i: Q. xi. A. 2]

THE third point of inquiry is whether the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons or Hypostases: and seemingly they do not.

1. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i): Every relative expression signifies something besides the relation expressed: thus a master is a man, a slave is a man. Now the Persons in God are expressed relatively. Therefore they are something besides the relative term: and consequently they are not constituted by the relations: for if you remove that which constitutes a thing it is no longer a thing.

2. It will be replied that in God that which is besides Paternity is the Father.

On the contrary it is evident that Father is also a relative term. If then through Paternity being relative the Person must contain something besides Paternity, for the same reason beside being Father the Person must contain something that is not relative.

3. Augustine says (ibid.) that in no sense can the Father be referred to himself, but whatsoever is said of him is in relation to the Son. Thus the same conclusion follows as before.

4. One may reply that what the Father is besides the relation is the essence.

On the contrary whatsoever is in a relative besides the relation is referred to the other thing by that relation, as may be seen from the examples which he gives: thus man is related to servant by the relationship of dominion. Now the essence in God

is not related, since it neither begets nor is begotten. Therefore this cannot be said of the essence but of the subject of the relation, which subject begets or is begotten.

5. A thing is considered in itself before we refer it to another. Now nothing is constituted by that which comes after it in our consideration of it. Therefore the hypostasis of the Father is not constituted by its relation to something else.

6. In God hypostases are more perfect than in us. But in us properties neither constitute nor distinguish hypostases, but are signs of distinction in hypostases already constituted. Therefore neither in God do the relations which are properties constitute or distinguish the hypostases.

7. Logically the generating hypostasis precedes generation, since the generator is understood to be the principle of generation: and logically generation precedes Paternity, since relations follow actions or passions (Metaph. v). Therefore logically the hypostasis of the Father precedes Paternity, and consequently is not constituted by it, as neither is the hypostasis of the Son by Filiation.

8. No form is constituted or distinctive outside its own genus; thus whiteness constitutes and distinguishes a white from a black thing in point of quality: likewise length constitutes and differentiates a thing in point of quantity. Therefore neither is relation constitutive or distinctive outside the genus of relation. But a hypostasis belongs to the genus of substance. Therefore relation neither constitutes nor distinguishes the hypostasis.

9. In God relation is the divine essence: wherefore if it constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis, this is either qua the divine substance or qua relation. Not, however, qua divine essence, because since this is common to the three Persons it cannot be the principle of their distinction: nor again qua relation, because relation does not signify anything self-subsistent in which is the meaning of the word hypostasis, but

merely reference to another. Therefore relation nowise distinguishes or constitutes the hypostasis.

10. In God nothing constitutes or distinguishes itself. Now the relations are themselves the hypostases: for just as Godhead and God do not differ, so neither do Paternity and Father. Therefore the relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases.

11. One should not ask how two things are distinct unless they have something in common which is distinguished by something added in each of them: thus animal is common to man and horse, and is distinguished as rational and irrational by the addition of differences: wherefore we may ask how man and horse differ. Whereas things which have nothing in common so as to be distinguished in the foregoing manner are distinct by themselves and not by any distinguishing principle. Now two divine hypostases have nothing common but the essence, and this is not in any way distinguished by relations. Therefore it should be said not that the hypostases are distinguished by the relations, but that they are distinct by themselves.

12. Nothing causes what it presupposes. But relation presupposes distinction, since thereby one thing is referred to another, and otherness implies distinction. Therefore relation cannot be a principle of distinction.

13. Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 15) says that in the angels the hypostases are distinguished by quality alone, and in God by origin alone. Now origin differs logically from relation, as generation from Paternity. Therefore the hypostases are distinguished not by relation but by origin.

14. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 7) the divine hypostases are distinguished by their properties. Now it is the property of the Father that he begot the Son, according to Augustine, and of the Son that he is born of the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by generation and birth. But

these denote origin, therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by origin and not by relation.

15. There are some relations in God which neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, such as equality and likeness. Therefore neither do the other relations, such as Paternity and Filiation, constitute and distinguish the hypostases.

On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God relation alone multiplies the Trinity. Now multitude in the Trinity: arises from constituted and distinct hypostases. Therefore relation alone constitutes the Persons and hypostases.

Moreover things are distinguished only by what is not predicated of them in common. Now the relations alone are predicated of the divine Persons severally and not in common according to Augustine (De Trin. v, 8). Therefore the Persons and hypostases in God are distinguished by the relations alone.

I answer that there are two opinions on this question. The first is that in God relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, but show that they are constituted and distinct. In order to elucidate the point it must be observed that this word hypostasis denotes an individual substance, one to wit that cannot be predicated of several. Hence genera and species in the predicament of substance, such as man or animal, cannot be called hypostases, since they are predicated of several: whereas Socrates and Plato are called hypostases because they are predicated of one only. Accordingly if, as Jews and pagans assert, there is no Trinity in God, there is no need to ask what constitutes or distinguishes the hypostasis since this is nothing but the divine essence: because by his very essence God is something undivided in itself, and distinct from all things that are not God. Seeing, however, that the Catholic Faith teaches that there is one essence in three Persons, it is inconceivable that the divine essence distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in God: because we understand the Godhead as constituting God, and as common to the three Persons and therefore as predicated of several subjects and not as an incommunicable hypostasis. In like manner nothing that is said of God absolutely can be understood as distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the

Persons, since what is predicated of God absolutely conveys the notion of something essential. Wherefore that which constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis in the divine Persons must be that which before anything else is not predicated of several but exclusively of one. Now there are two things that fulfil this condition, relation and origin, and generation and Paternity (or birth and Filiation), which although they are really but one thing in God, differ nevertheless logically and in their mode of signification. Logically the first of these is origin, for relation seemingly follows origin. Wherefore this opinion holds that the divine hypostases are constituted and distinguished by their origin, and this is indicated when we say A is from B, and from B is A: and that the relations of Paternity and Filiation logically follow the constitution and distinction of the Persons, and indicate the constitution and distinction of the hypostases. Thus, the fact that one is called Father shows that another originates from him: and the fact that one is called Son shows that he originates from another. Nor does it follow from this opinion that the divine hypostases, if not distinguished by their relations, are distinguished by something absolute, since the origins themselves imply relation: seeing that as father denotes relationship to a son, so does begetter to one begotten.

Nevertheless this opinion seemingly is void of foundation. For a thing may be understood to distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in two ways. It may be taken for the principle whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted and distinguished; as man is constituted by humanity, and Socrates by 'socrateity': or it may be taken for the way as it were to distinction and constitution: thus we might say that Socrates is a man by his generation which is the way to the form whereby he is constituted formally. It is clear then that a thing's origin cannot be understood as constituting and distinguishing except in reference to that which constitutes and distinguishes formally: since if humanity were not produced by generation, never would a man be constituted by generation. Consequently it cannot be said that the hypostasis of the Son is constituted by its nativity, except in so far as we take its nativity as terminating in something whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted. Now the relation in which nativity terminates is filiation. Therefore the hypostasis of the Son must be formally constituted and distinguished by Filiation and not by its origin: nor by the relation implied in the origin, since the relation implied in the origin like the origin itself denotes something not as yet subsistent in the nature but as tending thereto. And since all hypostases of the same nature have the same constitutive and distinguishing principle, it follows that in like manner on the part

of the Father we must understand that the hypostasis of the Father is constituted and distinguished by Paternity, and not by active generation nor by the relation implied thereby.

This is the second opinion, namely that the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons and hypostases: and it may be explained as follows. As already proved, Paternity is the same as the divine essence: and likewise the Father is the same as God: wherefore Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes God. And just as Paternity, although it is the divine essence, is not common as the essence is: even so although the Father is the very same thing as God, he is not common as God is, but proper. Accordingly God the Father as God is something common as having the divine nature, and as Father is something proper and distinct from the other Persons. Hence he is a hypostasis, which signifies that which subsists in a nature and is distinct from others: so that Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes the hypostasis.

Reply to the First Objection. The divine Persons are something besides a relation: this is the essence which is not spoken of relatively. This is what Augustine means to say as may be seen by studying his words carefully.

Hence we grant the Second and Third Objections.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although relation is not attributed to the essence as though it were a form, it is attributed to it as identical with it. For even if we do not say that the essence begets or is related, we do say that it is a generation and relation. However, relative terms are predicated of the essential names in the concrete even by way of information: thus we say that God begets God, and that God is related to God, inasmuch as relation and essence are understood as having a common supposite, as we have shown: although the essential names themselves are not distinct. Wherefore apart from the relative terms the essential names are understood in the concrete, since through the relations they have a relative signification.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In each divine hypostasis we speak of something that is absolute: this belongs to the essence, and in our way of thinking precedes the divine relations. Yet that which we conceive as absolute, since it is common, does not regard the distinction of the hypostases: so that it does not follow that we must conceive the hypostasis as distinct before we understand its relation.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In lower things hypostases are distinct in essence, so that the properties which result from the essence cannot be the principle of distinction, but are signs thereof. But the divine hypostases are nowise distinct in essence wherefore the properties must be the principle of this distinction.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Two things are requisite to constitute a hypostasis. First it must be self-subsistent and undivided in itself: secondly it must be distinct from other hypostases of the same nature. If, however, there be no other hypostases of the same nature it will still be a hypostasis, even as Adam when there were not as yet other hypostases in human nature. Hence the generating hypostasis must always be presupposed to generation, insofar as it is self-subsistent and undivided in itself, but not as distinct from other hypostases of the same nature, if other hypostases of the same nature originate solely by this kind of generation: thus Adam was not distinct from other hypostases of the same nature before the formation of the woman from his rib, and the birth of his children. But in God the hypostases are not multiplied except by the procession of the other Persons from one. Wherefore we understand the Person of the Father as subsistent before we understand him as begetting, and not as distinct from the other hypostases of the same nature which do not proceed unless we presuppose this generation. And although the divine relations constitute the hypostases and thus make them subsistent, they do this inasmuch as they are the divine essence: because a relation as such neither has nor can give subsistence, for this belongs to a substance alone. On the other hand the relations as such distinguish, for it is as such that they are mutually opposed. It follows then that the relation of Paternity, inasmuch as it constitutes the hypostasis of the Father (which it does as identical with the divine substance) is presupposed to generation, but inasmuch as it distinguishes, generation is presupposed to Paternity. As regards the Son there is

no further difficulty: because birth logically precedes the hypostasis of the one born, for we conceive it as the way to it: since generation is the way to substance.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. As we have already stated in God relation is something besides relation; for it is God's very substance in reality: wherefore it can constitute something subsistent and not merely relative.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. As already stated relation as such distinguishes the hypostasis: while as identical with the divine essence it constitutes the hypostasis, and does both inasmuch as it is both relation and divine essence.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. In God the abstract and the concrete do not differ in reality, since in God there is neither accident nor matter: they differ only in their manner of signification, inasmuch as we understand the Godhead as constituting God and God as having Godhead: the same applies to Paternity and the Father, for though they are really the same thing, they differ in their mode of signification.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although in God nothing is really common save the one essence, there is a logical community in the divine Persons in the fact that each is a supposite of the essence. This community is indicated in all concrete essential names, that signify the supposite in general: for instance, God is one who has the Godhead. Accordingly it is logically common to the three Persons to be a supposite of the divine nature, although the three Persons are not one supposite, but three: even as Socrates and Plato are two men although it is logically common to them to be a man. Now a difference is sought not only in things that have something real in common, but even in those that have something in common logically.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Relation presupposes the distinction of the other genera such as substance and quantity; and sometimes also of action and passion: whereas it does not presuppose but causes the distinction arising from towardness: thus the relation of double presupposes the relation of great and small, whereas it

does not presuppose but causes the relation of 2 to 1. In God, however, there is no other than relative distinction.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Richard says that the Persons are distinct by their origin, inasmuch as they are distinguished by relations of origin.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine uses the words begot the Son and is the Father as having the same meaning: wherefore he sometimes speaks of origin instead of relation.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The relations of equality and likeness cannot cause a distinction of Persons in God, rather do they presuppose it. Likeness is sameness of quality in things that differ, and equality is sameness of quantity in things that are distinct. Thus it is clear that distinction of supposites is presupposed to both likeness and equality.

Q. VIII: ARTICLE IV

If Mental Abstraction Be Made of the Relations, Do the Divine Hypostases Remain?

[Sum. Th. I, Q. xl, A. 3]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether if we make mental abstraction of the relations the divine hypostases remain, and it would seem that they do remain.

1. In the created world everything is made to a likeness of what is in God. Now if we make abstraction of the relations and properties of the human hypostasis there still remains the hypostasis. Therefore the same applies to God.

2. It is not owing to the same reason that the Father is someone and that he is the Father: for the Son also is someone and yet he is not the Father. Hence if we remove Paternity from the Father he is still someone. Now he is someone inasmuch as he is a hypostasis. Therefore if we remove Paternity by mental abstraction, the hypostasis of the Father still remains.

3. Seeing that we understand a thing through its definition, we can understand anything even if abstraction be made of what is not included in its definition. Now relation is not included in the definition of a hypostasis. Therefore we can make abstraction of the relation and still understand the hypostasis.

4. Jews and heathens understand that there is a hypostasis in God, for they conceive him to be a self-subsistent being: yet they do not understand Paternity, Filiation and like relations in him. Therefore if we make abstraction of such relations the hypostases still remain in God.

5. That to which anything is added remains when the addition is removed: thus man adds rational to animal (since man is a rational animal): wherefore if we remove rational, animal remains. Now Person adds a property to hypostasis: for person signifies a "hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity." Therefore if by abstraction we remove property from the Person, the hypostasis remains.

6. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 2) that the Word is begotten Wisdom. Now wisdom presupposes the hypostasis and begotten presupposes the property. Therefore if we remove from the Word that he is begotten, his hypostasis still remains: and the same applies to the other Persons.

7. If we make abstraction, of Paternity and Filiation there still remain in God the One (proceeding) from another and One from whom another (proceeds). But these denote the hypostases. Therefore abstraction being made of the relations the hypostases remain in God.

8. Though the constituent difference be removed the genus remains. Now the personal properties by constituting the Persons are in God as constituent differences. Therefore if these properties be removed, the genus person or hypostasis remains.

9. Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6) that if we remove the fact that (this Person) is the Father, it still remains that he is unbegotten. Now unbegotten is a property that can have no other subject but a hypostasis. Therefore if we make abstraction of Paternity, the hypostasis of the Father still remains.

10. As the relations are properties of the hypostases, so are the attributes properties of the essence. Now if we make abstraction of an essential attribute we still conceive the divine substance: thus Boethius says (De Hebdom.) that if by abstraction we remove goodness from God, it still remains that he is God. Therefore in like manner if we remove the relations, the hypostases; still remain in God.

11. According to Boethius (Super Proem. Porphyry. in Praed.) it is proper to the intellect to separate things that are naturally united. Now property and hypostasis are really united in God. Therefore the intellect can separate them.

12. It is possible to conceive a thing after removing what it contains: thus we can conceive a subject after an accident has been removed from it. Now the divine relations are said to be in the hypostases. Therefore after the relations have been removed by abstraction the hypostases remain.

On the contrary, in God no distinction is possible except by the relations. Now the hypostasis denotes something distinct. Therefore the hypostases do not remain if the relations be removed. For seeing that in God there are only two modes of predication, namely substantive and relative, if the relations be removed nothing remains to be predicated except substantively: and such are things that regard the essence, so that the hypostases will no longer be distinct.

I answer that as stated above (A. 3) some have contended that in God the hypostases are not constituted or distinguished by the relations but only by their origin. And, they held relation to be consequent to the origin of the Person as terminating and completing it, so as to indicate a certain dignity. Wherefore since person is thought to denote dignity, they said that the hypostasis with the added relation is conceived to constitute the Person; and thus they held the relations to constitute the Person and not the hypostasis. In this sense it is customary with some to call these relations Personalities: and consequently just as with us if we remove from a man that which pertains to dignity and makes him a person, his hypostasis remains, even so in God if we mentally abstract these personal relations from the Persons they say that the hypostases but not the Persons will remain. Seeing, however, that as we have proved above (A. 3) these relations both constitute and distinguish the hypostases, we must hold the contrary opinion that abstraction being made of these relations neither the Persons nor the hypostases remain: because if the constituents of a thing be removed the thing itself cannot remain.

Reply to the First Objection. Neither relations nor properties constitute the human hypostasis, whereas we have proved that they constitute the divine hypostasis: wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to the Second Objection. From the same cause the Father is someone and is the Father: the same that is, really and not only logically, yet with a logical distinction, either as that of generic and specific, or of common and proper. Thus it is plain that from the same form man is an animal and, is a man (since one thing has not several actually distinct substantial forms): yet from his soul inasmuch as it is a sensible soul, he is only an animal, and from his soul as both sensible and rational, he is a man. Hence a horse is an animal but is not a man; because its sensible soul is not the same sensible soul as that of a man, and for that reason it is not the same individual animal as a man. The same applies to the question in point. The Father is someone and is the Father on account of the relation: but he is someone on account of the relation considered in general: while that he is a particular someone is due to this particular relation which is Paternity. For this

reason again the Son, in whom is a relation, but not the relation of Paternity, is someone, but he is not that particular someone that is the Father.

Reply to the Third Objection. The definition of a thing may include something in two ways: explicitly, i.e. actually, or implicitly, i.e. potentially. The definition of an animal does not include the rational soul explicitly and actually, for then every animal would have a rational soul: but it includes it implicitly and potentially, because an animal is a sensible animate substance. Now just as soul includes rational soul potentially, so does animated being contain rational being potentially: so that where the definition of animal is actually applied to man, rational must be included in the definition of animal explicitly, for as much as animal is the same as man. It is thus in the case in point: for hypostasis considered in general is a distinct substance, wherefore since there can be no distinction in God except by reason of relation, when I say 'divine hypostasis' it must of necessity be conceived as distinct by reason of a relation. Hence although relation is not included in the definition of the hypostasis that is a man, it is included in the definition of a divine hypostasis.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Jews and heathens do not conceive the essence as distinct except from things of another nature, and such distinction arises from the divine essence itself. We, however, conceive the hypostasis as distinct from that which is of the same nature, and from which it cannot be distinguished otherwise than by relation alone. Hence the objection proves nothing.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The manner of definition differs in accidents and substances. Substances are not defined by something outside their essence: wherefore the first thing included in the definition of a substance is the genus, which is predicated essentially of the thing defined. Whereas an accident is defined by something outside its essence, namely by its subject, on which it depends for its being. Hence in its definition the subject takes the place of the genus: for instance, simous means "flat-nosed." Accordingly just as if we remove the difference from the definition of a substance the genus remains, even so if we remove the accident (which takes the place of the difference) from the definition of an accident the subject remains. There is, however, a difference. When the difference is removed the genus remains, but not identically the same: thus if we remove rational, the

same identical animal which is rational animal does not remain; whereas when from the definition of an accident we remove that which takes the place of the difference the same identical subject remains, thus the same nose remains when we remove the curved or 'pug' shape. This is because an accident does not complete the essence of its subject as the difference completes the essence of the genus. When therefore we say, I a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity, hypostasis is included in the definition of person not as subject but as genus. Wherefore if we remove the property pertaining to dignity the hypostasis does not remain the same identically or specifically but only generically, and as applied to nonrational substances.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. When we say, The Word is Begotten Wisdom, 'Wisdom' stands for the hypostasis, although it does not signify it. Hence it does not include the property in its signification, and so it is necessary to add it: thus I might say that God is the Begotten Son.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. He that proceeds from another and he from whom another proceeds do not differ from Filiation and Paternity save as common from proper: since Son denotes him who is from another by generation, and Father signifies him from whom another is by generation: unless we contend that he who is from another and he from whom another is denote the origin, while Father and Son denote the consequent relations. But we have already made it plain that the hypostases are constituted not by their origins but by their relations.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. After abstraction of the constituent difference, the genus remains in common but not in any species or individual.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Augustine does not mean to say that God the Father remains unbegotten if we abstract his Paternity, except perhaps in so far as unbegotten would then denote a condition of nature and not a property of the Person. His intention was to show that if we abstract the Paternity, unbegotten may still remain in general: since it is not necessary that whatsoever is unbegotten be the Father.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The notion of goodness does not constitute the notion of the essence, in fact good is conceived as informing being. On the other hand the property constitutes the hypostasis: wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the mind is able to separate certain things that are united, it cannot do so in every case: for it cannot separate things one of which enters into the definition of the other; thus it cannot separate animal from man. Now property enters into the definition of the hypostasis: wherefore the objection does not prove.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. If one removes that which is in another as subject or place, that in which it was remains: but it is not so if we remove that which is part of a thing's essence: thus man no longer remains if we remove rational: and in like manner if we remove the property, the hypostasis does not remain.